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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
From Arrow’s celebrated theorem of social choice, it is well known that the
aggregation of individuals’ preferences into a social ordering cannot make the
social ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individuals’ prefer-
ences over that pair (this is the famous axiom of Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives). Or, more precisely, it cannot do so without trespassing basic
requirements of unanimity (the Pareto principle) and anonymity (even the
very weak condition of non-dictatorship). This raises the following question:
What additional information about preferences would be needed in pairwise
comparisons in order to make the aggregation of preferences possible, and
compatible with the basic requirements of unanimity and anonymity?
In the last decades, the literature on social choice has explored several
paths and gave interesting answers to this question. The main avenue of
research has been, after Sen (1970) and d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977), the
introduction of information about utilities, and it has been shown that the
classical social welfare functions, and less classical ones, could be obtained
with the Arrovian axiomatic method by letting the social preferences take
account of speciﬁc kinds of utility information. Another, very important,
approach, initiated by Foley (1967), Kolm (1972) and Varian (1974) among
others,1 has studied the problem of fair allocation in economic models and
has managed to get round Arrow—like impossibility and to propose a myriad
of nicely behaved allocation rules. Although the usual interpretation of this
success rests on the fact that allocation rules do not aggregate preferences
but only selects a subset of ﬁrst-best allocations, the relationships between
the theory of fair allocation and the theory of social choice have remained
rather loose up to now.
In this paper, we focus on the introduction of additional information
about preferences that is not of the utility sort. In other words, we retain
a framework with purely ordinal, non-comparable preferences. The kind of
information that we study is about the shape of indiﬀerence curves, and we
ask how much one needs to know about the indiﬀerence curves to rank a
pair of allocations by social ordering functions satisfying the unanimity and
anonymity requirements. The introduction of this additional information is
formulated here in terms of weakening Arrow’s axiom of independence of
irrelevant alternatives. As shown below, it turns out that a good deal of
1For a survey, see Moulin and Thomson (1997).
2information is needed. Purely local information like marginal rates of substi-
tution would not do, and we establish an extension of Arrow’s theorem to
this kind of information.
We also study the same question about allocation rules, whose particular
feature is that they dichotomize all allocations between the desirable ones
and the rest. We show that additional information is also needed there,
although in a less demanding way. For instance, information about marginal
rates of substitution is enough to get out of Arrow-like impossibility.
The framework adopted here is an economic model, namely, the canonical
model of division of inﬁnitely divisible commodities among a ﬁnite set of
agents. We chose to study an economic model rather than the abstract
model that is now commonly used in the theory of social choice2 for three
reasons. First, it allows a more ﬁne-grained analysis of the information about
preferences, because it makes it sensible to talk about marginal rates of
substitution and other local notions about indiﬀerence curves. Second, in
an economic model preferences are naturally restricted, and by considering a
restricted domain we can hope to obtain positive results with less information
than under unrestricted domain. Third, it makes it possible to compare the
informational requirements for social ordering functions and allocation rules
in a context that is relevant to the existing literature on fair allocation. In
this way, we are able to contribute to bridging the gap between the theory
of social choice and the theory of fair allocation.
The motivation for our research draws on many straws taken from recent
and less recent literature. Attempts to construct social ordering functions and
similar objects embodying unanimity and equity requirements were made by
Suzumura (1981a,b, 1983) and Tadenuma (1998). Fleurbaey (1996) and Roe-
mer (1996) noticed that most allocation rules in the theory of fair allocation
violate conditions akin to the Arrow independence of irrelevant alternatives,
although they do not use utility information. The idea that information
about indiﬀerence curves is suﬃcient, hinted at by Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978) and Maniquet (1994), was revived by Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de
gaer (1999) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996, 2000) who were able to con-
struct nicely behaved social ordering functions on this basis. Campbell and
Kelly (2000) recently studied essentially the same issue in the abstract model
of social choice, and showed that limited information about preferences may
2Recollect, however, that Arrow’s initial presentations (1950, 1951) dealt with this
economic model of division of commodities.
3be enough, although they focus on non-dictatorship and do not study how
much information is necessary with the stronger requirement of anonymity.
Le Breton (1997), in a nice synthesis, presented a uniﬁed view of the theory
of social choice and the theory of fair allocation, but without emphasizing
the issue of the informational basis.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the frame-
work and the main notions. The results are presented in Section 3, for social
ordering functions, and in Section 4, for allocation rules. Section 5 concludes.
The appendix contains some proofs.
2M o d e l a n d D e ﬁnitions
2.1 The Model
The population is ﬁxed. Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of agents where
2 ≤ n<∞. There are ` goods indexed by k =1 ,...,` where 2 ≤ `<∞.
Agent i’s consumption bundle is a vector xi =( xi1,...,xi`). An allocation is
av e c t o rx =( x1,...,xn). The set of allocations is Rn`
+ . The set of allocations
such that no individual bundle xi is equal to the zero vector is denoted X.
A preordering is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation. Agent i’s
preferences are described by a complete preordering Ri (strict preference Pi,
indiﬀerence Ii)o nR`
+. A proﬁle of preferences is denoted R =( R1,...,R n).
Let R be the set of continuous, convex, and strictly monotonic preferences
over R`
+.
There is no production,3 and the amount of total resources is a given
ω ∈ R`
++. All allocations x such that
P
i∈N xi ≤ ω are said to be feasible.4
Let






Notice that all our results would remain true under the assumption of free




ω}. Let E(R) denote the set of Pareto-eﬃcient allocations. Because of strict
monotonicity of preferences, there is no need to distinguish Pareto-eﬃciency
in the strong sense and in the weak sense.
3Our results about social ordering functions could be extended with little change to
the case when production is possible.
4Vector inequalities are denoted as usual: ≥,>,and À.
4A social ordering function (SOF) is a mapping ¯ R deﬁned on Rn, such
that for all R ∈ Rn, ¯ R(R) is a complete preordering on the set of alloca-
tions Rn`
+ . Let ¯ P(R) (resp. ¯ I(R)) denote the related strict preference (resp.
indiﬀerence) relations.
An allocation rule (AR) is a set-valued mapping S deﬁned on Rn, such
that for all R ∈ Rn,S (R) is a non-empty subset of F. An AR is essentially
single-valued if all selected allocations are Pareto-indiﬀerent:
∀x,y ∈ S(R),∀i ∈ N, xiIiyi.
An alternative deﬁnition of SOFs and ARs makes them a function of ω
as well as R. This is useful when changes in ω are studied, but here we
focus only on the information about preferences, and since ω is kept ﬁxed
throughout the paper, we omit this argument.
An AR dichotomizes the set of all allocations between the desirable ones
and the rest. Hence, it can be regarded as a “two-tier” SOF. The fact that
ARs are just a particular kind of SOF allows us to study the informational
bases for SOFs and ARs in a uniﬁed way. In particular, the axioms of inde-
pendence which, as presented below, express the informational requirements
for SOFs, can be directly applied to ARs, without restriction.
Let π be a bijection on N. For any x ∈ Rn`





i = xπ(i) for all i ∈ N, and for any R ∈ Rn, deﬁne π(R)=
(R0
1,...,R0
n) ∈ Rn by R0
i = Rπ(i) for all i ∈ N.L e t Π be the set of all
bijections on N. The basic requirements of unanimity and anonymity on
which we focus in this paper are the following.
Weak Pareto for SOF: ∀x,y ∈ Rn`
+,∀R ∈ Rn if ∀i ∈ N, xiPiyi, then
x ¯ P(R)y.
This axiom cannot be applied to ARs, because it requires a too ﬁne-
grained ranking of allocations. The usual practice in the theory of fair allo-
cation is to require the selected allocations to be Pareto-eﬃcient.
Pareto for AR: ∀R ∈ Rn,S (R) ⊂ E(R).
Anonymity for SOF: ∀x,y ∈ Rn`
+, ∀R ∈ Rn, ∀π ∈ Π,
x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ π(x) ¯ R(π(R))π(y).
This axiom may be directly applied to ARs, although it is worthwhile to
notice that it then boils down to the following simple condition.
5Anonymity for AR: ∀R ∈ Rn, ∀π ∈ Π, ∀x ∈ S(R), π(x) ∈ S(π(R)).
Concerning the non-dictatorship form of anonymity, we only deﬁne here
what dictatorship means, for convenience. Notice that it has to do only with
allocations in X, that is, without any zero bundle.
Dictatorial SOF: The SOF ¯ R is dictatorial if there exists i0 ∈ N such that:
∀x,y ∈ X,∀R ∈ R
n,x i0Pi0yi0 ⇒ x ¯ P(R)y.
Again, this deﬁnition is not meaningful for ARs, since it cannot be ob-
served among “two-tier” rankings. Following Le Breton (1997), and in view
of monotonicity of individual preferences, we propose the following adapted
deﬁnition for ARs.
Dictatorial AR: The AR S is dictatorial if there exists i0 ∈ N such that:
∀R ∈ R
n,S (R)={x ∈ R
nl
+|xi0 = ω}.
It is also worth introducing the following axiom, which is speciﬁct oA R s . 5
Equal Treatment of Equals (for AR): ∀R ∈ Rn, ∀x ∈ S(R), ∀i,j ∈ N,
if Ri = Rj, then xiIixj.
Lemma 1 Any essentially single-valued AR satisfying Anonymity also sat-
isﬁes Equal Treatment of Equals.
2.2 Variants of Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-
tives
The traditional, Arrovian, version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
is:
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): ∀x,y ∈ Rn`
+ , ∀R,R0 ∈
Rn, if ∀i ∈ N, xiRiyi ⇔ xiR0
iyi, then x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ x ¯ R(R0)y.
Notice that it would be equivalent to write the conclusion as:
x ¯ P(R)y ⇔ x ¯ P(R
0)y.
This remark will be useful when adapting this condition to ARs.
5Related conditions can be deﬁned for SOFs. See footnote 8.
6It is possible to weaken IIA by strengthening the premise. This amounts
to allowing the SOF to make use of more information when ranking any pair
of allocations.
We ﬁrst consider the possibility for the SOF to take account of marginal
rates of substitution. Economists are used to focus on marginal rates of
substitution when assessing the eﬃciency of an allocation, especially under
convexity, since for convex preferences the marginal rates of substitution
determine the half space in which the upper contour set lies. Moreover,
for eﬃcient allocations, shadow prices enable one to compute the relative
implicit income shares of diﬀerent agents, thereby potentially providing a
relevant measure of inequalities in the distribution of resources. Therefore,
taking account of marginal rates of substitution is a natural extension of the
informational basis of social choice in economic environments. Let C(xi,R i)
denote the cone of price vectors that support the upper contour set for Ri at
xi :
C(xi,R i)={p ∈ R
`|∀y ∈ R
`
+,py= pxi ⇒ xiRiy}.
When preferences Ri are strictly monotonic, one has C(xi,R i) ⊂ R`
++ when-
ever xi À 0.
IIA with Marginal Rates of Substitution (IIA-MRS): ∀x,y ∈ Rn`
+ ,
∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if ∀i ∈ N, xiRiyi ⇔ xiR0
iyi and C(xi,R i)=C(xi,R 0
i),
C(yi,R i)=C(yi,R 0
i), then x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ x ¯ R(R0)y.
Marginal rates of substitution give an inﬁnitesimally local piece of infor-
mation about preferences at given allocations. It would be interesting to take
account of the preferences over some ﬁnitely sized neighborhoods of the two





|xik − vk| ≤ ε}
IIA with ε-Neighborhoods (IIA-εN): ∀x,y ∈ Rn`
+ , ∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if ∀i ∈
N, xiRiyi ⇔ xiR0
iyi and ∀(z,z0) ∈ Bε(xi)2 ∪ Bε(yi)2,zR iz0 ⇔ zR0
iz0, then
x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ x ¯ R(R0)y.
An alternative extension of the informational basis allows the SOF to
take account of parts of indiﬀerence hypersurfaces. The indiﬀerence sets are
deﬁned as
I(xi,R i)={z ∈ R
`
+ | zIixi}.
7Here we consider two ways of focusing on parts of such sets. First, it is natural
to focus on the part of indiﬀerence sets which lies within the feasible set.
However, when considering any pair of allocations, the two allocations may
need diﬀerent amounts of total resources to be feasible. Therefore we need
to introduce the following notions. The smallest amount of total resources
which makes two allocations x and y feasible can be deﬁned by ω(x,y)=




i∈N yik} for all k ∈
{1,...,`}. For any vector t ∈ R`






+ | z ≤ t
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The following axiom captures the idea that the ranking of two allocations
should depend only on the indiﬀerence sets, and on preferences over the
minimal subset in which the two allocations are feasible.
IIA with Indiﬀerence Sets on Feasible Allocations (IIA-ISFA):
∀x,y ∈ Rn`
+, ∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if ∀i ∈ N,I(xi,R i) ∩ Ω(ω(x,y)) = I(xi,R 0
i) ∩
Ω(ω(x,y)),I (yi,R i) ∩ Ω(ω(x,y)) = I(yi,R 0
i) ∩ Ω(ω(x,y)), then x ¯ R(R)y ⇔
x ¯ R(R0)y.
It will actually be worth considering a much weaker axiom, which relies
on radial expansions of the minimal feasible set in which the two allocations
to be compared are feasible. A radial expansion is deﬁned as follows: for any
set Q ⊂ R` and any λ ≥ 1,
λQ = {q ∈ R
`|λ
−1q ∈ Q}.
T h en e x ta x i o mi sv e r yw e a ks i n c ei ta l l o w st h er a d i a lf a c t o rλ to be arbitrarily
large.
IIA with Indiﬀerence Sets on Expanded Feasible Allocations (IIA-
ISEFA): ∃λ ≥ 1,∀x,y ∈ Rn`
+ , ∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if ∀i ∈ N,I(xi,R i) ∩
λΩ(ω(x,y)) = I(xi,R 0
i) ∩ λΩ(ω(x,y)),I (yi,R i) ∩ λΩ(ω(x,y)) = I(yi,R 0
i) ∩
λΩ(ω(x,y)), then x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ x ¯ R(R0)y.
A second way of extending the information about indiﬀerence sets is to
rely on a path
Λω0 = {λω0 ∈ R
`
++|λ ∈ R+},
where ω0 ∈ R`
++ is ﬁxed, and to focus on the part of the indiﬀerence sets
which belongs to this path. The idea of referring to such a path has been
introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978), and may be justiﬁed if the path
8contains relevant benchmark bundles. The choice of ω0 is not discussed here,
but it need not be arbitrary. For instance, one may imagine that it could rely
on appropriate equity conditions.
IIA with Indiﬀerence Sets on Path ω0 (IIA-ISPω0): ∀x,y ∈ Rn`
+ ,
∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if ∀i ∈ N,I(xi,R i) ∩ Λω0 = I(xi,R 0
i) ∩ Λω0,I (yi,R i) ∩ Λω0 =
I(yi,R 0
i) ∩ Λω0, then x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ x ¯ R(R0)y.
The last extension of informational basis that we consider is to introduce
whole indiﬀerence hypersurfaces. This condition was already introduced and
studied by Hansson (1973) in the abstract model of social choice, who showed
that the Borda rule satisﬁes it.
IIA with Whole Indiﬀerence Sets (IIA-WIS): ∀x,y ∈ Rn`
+ , ∀R,R0 ∈
Rn, if ∀i ∈ N, I(xi,R i)=I(xi,R 0
i),I (yi,R i)=I(yi,R 0
i), then x ¯ R(R)y ⇔
x ¯ R(R0)y.














2.3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives for Allo-
cation Rules
IIA is an axiom for SOFs. It is not obvious how one can translate this
for ARs. One way is to consider ARs as two-tier SOFs. Recall that the
conclusion of IIA axioms for SOFs can be written
x ¯ P(R)y ⇔ x ¯ P(R
0)y.
I nt h ec a s eo fA R s ,x ¯ P(R)y reads:
x ∈ S(R) and y/ ∈ S(R).
This suggests a direct translation of the above IIA family of axioms.6
6We actually make a slight change, by applying the IIA axioms for ARs to allocations
in F only. This makes the axioms slightly weaker, and we chose to do this because it is
interesting to check that our results do not depend on considering infeasible allocations.
9Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): ∀x,y ∈ F, ∀R,R0 ∈
Rn, if ∀i ∈ N, xiRiyi ⇔ xiR0
iyi, then [x ∈ S(R) and y/ ∈ S(R)] ⇔ [x ∈ S(R0)
and y/ ∈ S(R0)].
IIA with Marginal Rates of Substitution (IIA-MRS): ∀x,y ∈ F,
∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if ∀i ∈ N, xiRiyi ⇔ xiR0
iyi and C(xi,R i)=C(xi,R 0
i),
C(yi,R i)=C(yi,R 0
i), then [x ∈ S(R) and y/ ∈ S(R)] ⇔ [x ∈ S(R0) and
y/ ∈ S(R0)].
IIA with Indiﬀerence Sets on Feasible Allocations (IIA-ISFA):
∀x,y ∈ F, ∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if ∀i ∈ N,I(xi,R i) ∩ Ω(ω)=I(xi,R 0
i) ∩ Ω(ω),
I(yi,R i) ∩ Ω(ω)=I(yi,R 0
i) ∩ Ω(ω), then [x ∈ S(R) and y/ ∈ S(R)]
⇔ [x ∈ S(R0) and y/ ∈ S(R0)].
IIA with Whole Indiﬀerence Sets (IIA-WIS): ∀x,y ∈ F, ∀R,R0 ∈ Rn,
if ∀i ∈ N, I(xi,R i)=I(xi,R 0
i),I (yi,R i)=I(yi,R 0
i), then [x ∈ S(R) and
y/ ∈ S(R)] ⇔ [x ∈ S(R0) and y/ ∈ S(R0)].
Notice that an axiom based on the path ω0 would not make sense here
because the condition
I(xi,R i) ∩ Λω0 = I(xi,R
0
i) ∩ Λω0
would not guarantee that x remains Pareto-eﬃcient.
Consider the AR S ¯ R r e l a t e dt oaS O F ¯ R in the following way: for all
R ∈ Rn,
S ¯ R(R)={x ∈ F | ∀y ∈ Z, x¯ R(R)y}.
It is worth noticing that even if ¯ R satisﬁes IIA for SOFs, and S ¯ R is well-
deﬁned (that is, S ¯ R(R) 6= ∅ for all R ∈ Rn), S ¯ R need not satisfy IIA for
ARs, although it must satisfy the following condition whenever the premiss
of IIA holds:
x ∈ S ¯ R(R) and y/ ∈ S ¯ R(R) ⇒ y/ ∈ S ¯ R(R
0).









and for all x,y ∈ Rn`
+ \{ x∗,y ∗},x ¯ I(R)y and x∗ ¯ P(R)x, y∗ ¯ P(R)x. One can
see that ¯ R satisﬁes IIA for SOFs, but S ¯ R does not satisfy IIA for ARs.
The same fact is true about all weaker IIA axioms.
10Another way to look at independence conditions for ARs is to imagine
independence conditions that bear only on one allocation. That would yield
the following family of axioms. The ﬁrst one is very strong, but it seems that
the usual premise in IIA does not put any local constraint on x, and it will
be shown later on that it is actually equivalent to IIA.
Independence of Preferences (IP): ∀x ∈ Rn`
+, ∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if x ∈ S(R),
then x ∈ S(R0).
The next one, dealing with marginal rates of substitution, is essentially
Nagahisa’s (1991) ‘Local Independence’:7
Independence of Preferences except MRS (IP-MRS): ∀x ∈ Rn`
+ ,
∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if x ∈ S(R) and for all i ∈ N, C(xi,R i)=C(xi,R 0
i), then
x ∈ S(R0).
The next axiom says that only the part of indiﬀerence sets concerning
feasible allocations should matter.
Independence of Preferences except Indiﬀerence Sets on Feasible
Allocations (IP-ISFA): ∀x ∈ Rn`
+ , ∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if x ∈ S(R) and for all
i ∈ N, I(xi,R i) ∩ Ω(ω)=I(xi,R 0
i) ∩ Ω(ω), then x ∈ S(R0).
Notice that this axiom is stronger than an axiom suggested by Le Breton
(1997),8 which states that only preferences over feasible allocations should
matter:
Independence of Preferences except Feasible Bundles (IP-FB):
∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if ∀x,y ∈ F,∀i ∈ N,xiRiyi ⇔ xiR0
iyi, then S(R)=S(R0).
7See also Yoshihara (1998).
8Le Breton’s synthesis of the theory of social choice and the theory of fair allocation (Le
Breton, 1997) is symmetrical to ours, and is based on the idea that a SOF can be viewed
as a particular kind of AR (choice correspondence) deﬁned over a rich set of agendas
(an agenda is a subset of alternatives from which the AR makes selections), typically
the set of all ﬁnite subsets of allocations. In his synthesis, the theory of fair allocation
is characterized by the facts that the preferences domain of ARs is restricted, and that
the agendas domain is restricted as well to have some speciﬁc structures (for instance,
the Edgeworth box). The axiom IP-FB embodies the choice theoretical version of Arrow
independence in this framework. One can see that under this independence condition, a
larger agenda allows ARs to use more information about preferences when deciding the
set of selected allocations. However, that framework seems less convenient than ours in
order to address the question of what information be retained when comparing a given
pair of allocations.
11The last axiom is due to Maniquet (1994).
Independence of Preferences except Whole Indiﬀerence Sets (IP-
WIS): ∀x ∈ Rn`
+ , ∀R,R0 ∈ Rn, if x ∈ S(R) and for all i ∈ N, I(xi,R i)=
I(xi,R 0
i), then x ∈ S(R0).
Although these independence of preferences axioms may seem extremely
restrictive, they are actually not really stronger than the previous IIA axioms.
Lemma 3 IP⇔IIA. On the class of ARs that never select x ∈ F with xi = ω
for some i, or are essentially single-valued, IP-MRS⇔IIA-MRS.
Proof. IP⇔IIA. It is obvious that IP⇒IIA. For the converse, choose any
i0 and deﬁne x0 by x0
i0 = ω (and x0
i =0for all i 6= i0). If for all R one has
S(R)=F then IP is satisﬁed. Suppose then that this is not the case, and
let R be such that S(R) 6= F.
First case: x0 ∈ S(R). Take any y/ ∈ S(R). By monotonicity of prefer-
ences, for all R0,







Therefore x0 ∈ S(R0) and y/ ∈ S(R0). The latter implies F\S(R) ⊂ F\S(R0).
Since x0 ∈ S(R0), one can show by a symmetrical argument that F \S(R0) ⊂
F \ S(R) implying S(R0)=S(R).
Second case: x0 / ∈ S(R). Take any x ∈ S(R). By monotonicity of prefer-








Therefore x0 / ∈ S(R) and x ∈ S(R0), and more generally S(R) ⊂ S(R0). By
a symmetrical argument based on x0 / ∈ S(R0), one shows that S(R0) ⊂ S(R).
IP-MRS⇔IIA-MRS. It is obvious that IP-MRS⇒IIA-MRS. For the con-
verse, let x ∈ S(R) and R0 be such that for all i, C(xi,R 0
i)=C(xi,R i).
First case: S never selects allocations where some agent has ω. Choose
y,z ∈ F such that y1 = z2 = ω. By strict monotonicity of preferences,
there exists R00 ∈ Rn such that for all i, C(xi,R 00
i)=C(xi,R i),C (yi,R 00
i)=
C(yi,R i),C (zi,R 00
i)=C(zi,R 0
i). Because y1 = ω,y/ ∈ S(R). By IIA-MRS,
x ∈ S(R00) and y/ ∈ S(R00). Because z2 = ω,z/ ∈ S(R00). And by IIA-MRS
again, x ∈ S(R0) and z/ ∈ S(R0).
Second case: S is essentially single-valued. Choose y,z ∈ F such that for
all i, for all a,b ∈ {xi,y i,z i},a6= b, either a À b or a ¿ b. By monotonicity
of preferences, there exists R00 ∈ Rn such that for all i, C(xi,R 00
i)=C(xi,R i),
12C(yi,R 00
i)=C(yi,R i),C (zi,R 00
i)=C(zi,R 0
i). By essential single-valuedness
of S and monotonicity of preferences, y/ ∈ S(R). By IIA-MRS, x ∈ S(R00)
and y/ ∈ S(R00). By essential single-valuedness again, z/ ∈ S(R00). And by
IIA-MRS again, x ∈ S(R0) and z/ ∈ S(R0).
Notice that in the proof of the second equivalence, one only needs to ﬁnd
allocations which are not selected by the AR for two proﬁles with the same
MRS at the allocations. We also have similar results for the ISFA and WIS
versions of the axioms.
3 Social Ordering Functions Need Indiﬀer-
ence Curves
Let us ﬁrst recall the formulation of Arrow’s theorem for this model (Bordes
and Le Breton 1989).
Proposition 1 If a SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA, then it is dicta-
torial.
It turns out, unfortunately, that introducing information about marginal
rates of substitution, in addition to pairwise preferences, does not make room
for the existence of satisfactory SOFs. More formally, weakening IIA to IIA-
MRS does not alter the dictatorship conclusion of Arrow’s theorem.
Proposition 2 If a SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA-MRS, then it is
dictatorial.
The proof of this Proposition is long and is relegated to the appendix.
Inada (1964, 1971) also considered marginal rates of substitution in an
IIA-like axiom, but the diﬀerence from our work is that he looked for a lo-
cal aggregator of preferences, namely a mapping deﬁning a social marginal
rate of substitution between goods and individuals, on the basis of individual
marginal rates of substitution. The global SOF was then obtained by inte-
grating the social marginal rates of substitution. Therefore his independence
condition was somewhat weaker since the social preference over two given
alternatives could depend on all marginal rates of substitution over paths
going from the ﬁrst alternative to the second one. On the other hand, we do
13not require diﬀerentiability of the social ordering, so that our result is not
logically related to Inada’s one.
T h en e x tp r o p o s i t i o ns h o w st h a ta ss o o na so n es w i t c h e sf r o mI I A - M R S
to IIA-εN, the dictatorship result is avoided, even for an arbitrarily small ε,
although it remains impossible to achieve Anonymity, even for an arbitrarily
large ε. Moreover, for a small ε, the non-dictatorial example given in the
proof remains dictatorial for most allocations, and one can safely conjecture
that any SOF which satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA-εN is largely dictatorial,
because under IIA-εN there are many free triples.
Proposition 3 Let ε > 0 be given. There exists a non-dictatorial SOF
satisfying Weak Pareto and IIA-εN. However, there does not exist a SOF
satisfying Weak Pareto, IIA-εNa n dA n o n y m i t y .
Proof. For the possibility result, deﬁne ¯ R as follows: x ¯ R(R)y if either
x1R1y1 and [{z ∈ R`
+|x1R1z} * Bε(0) or {z ∈ R`
+|y1R1z} * Bε(0)], or
x2R2y2 and [{z ∈ R`
+|x1R1z} ⊆ Bε(0) and {z ∈ R`
+|y1R1z} ⊆ Bε(0)]. For





. Weak Pareto and the
absence of dictator are straightforwardly satisﬁed. IIA-εN is also satisﬁed
because when Γ(x1) and Γ(y1) hold, one has Bε(0) ⊆ Bε(x1) ∩ Bε(y1), and
therefore Γ(x1) and Γ(y1) remain true if preferences are kept ﬁxed on Bε(x1)
and Bε(y1). It remains to check transitivity of ¯ R(R). First note the following
property. If Γ(v) and vR1v0, then Γ(v0). Assume that there exist x,y,z ∈ Rn`
+
such that x ¯ R(R)y ¯ R(R)z ¯ P(R)x. If Γ(x1) and Γ(y1) and Γ(z1),t h i si si m -
possible because one should have x2R2y2R2z2P2x2. If only one of the three
conditions Γ(x1),Γ(y1),Γ(z1) is satisﬁed, it is similarly impossible because one
should have x1R1y1R1z1P1x1. Assume Γ(x1) and Γ(y1) hold, but not Γ(z1).
Then y ¯ R(R)z ¯ P(R)x requires y1R1z1P1x1, which implies Γ(z1), ac o n t r a d i c -
tion. Assume Γ(x1) and Γ(z1) hold, but not Γ(y1). Then x ¯ R(R)y ¯ R(R)z
requires x1R1y1R1z1, which implies Γ(y1), a contradiction. Assume Γ(y1)
and Γ(z1) hold, but not Γ(x1). Then z ¯ P(R)x ¯ R(R)y requires z1P1x1R1y1,
which implies Γ(x1), a contradiction.
The proof of the impossibility is very similar to that of Proposition 4 and
is omitted here.
With the introduction of non-local information about indiﬀerence curves,
one is also able to avoid dictatorship, but incompatibility with Anonymity
remains. The result is important because no SOF violating Anonymity will
ever be considered acceptable.
14Proposition 4 There exists a non-dictatorial SOF satisfying Weak Pareto,
IIA-ISFA. However, there does not exist a SOF satisfying Weak Pareto, IIA-
ISEFA and Anonymity.
The proof is in the appendix.
From Pazner and Schmeidler’s (1978) contribution one can derive the
following result, which shows that not much information is needed, although
it must be substantially non-local.
Proposition 5 There exists a SOF satisfying Weak Pareto, IIA-ISPω0 and
Anonymity.
Proof. By continuity and monotonicity of preferences, the following utility
functions
ui(xi)=m i n {α ∈ R+|αω0Rixi}
are well-deﬁned and represent preferences Ri. Let ¯ R be deﬁned by: x ¯ R(R)y
whenever
min{ui(xi)|i ∈ N} ≥ min{ui(yi)|i ∈ N}.
This SOF clearly satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Anonymity. It also satisﬁes IIA-
ISPω0 because when I(xi,R i) ∩ Λω0 = I(xi,R 0
i) ∩ Λω0, one has
min{α ∈ R+|αω0Rixi} =m i n {α ∈ R+|αω0R
0
ixi}.
Notice that one could have the Strong Pareto property9 as well by relying
on the leximin criterion rather than the maximin for the SOF deﬁn e di nt h e
above proof. There are also many examples of SOFs satisfying Weak Pareto,
IIA-WIS and Anonymity. Thus, in addition to these three axioms, one may
add other requirements embodying various equity principles.10
9Strong Pareto for SOFs: ∀x,y ∈ Rn`
+ ,∀R ∈ Rn if ∀i ∈ N, xiRiyi, then x ¯ R(R)y
and if, in addition, ∃i ∈ N, xiPiyi, then x ¯ P(R)y.
10Notice that Strong Pareto and Anonymity already entail a version of the Suppes
grading principle: for all R ∈Rn, all x,y, if there are i,j such that Ri = Rj,x iPiyj and
xjPiyi, and for h 6= i,j, xh = yh, then x ¯ P(R)y. Notice also that it is easy to construct
SOFs satisfying Strong Pareto, IIA-WIS (or IIA-ISPω0), Anonymity and the following
version of the Hammond equity axiom (Hammond, 1976), which is similar to the Equal
Treatment of Equals axiom for ARs: for all R ∈Rn, and all x,y ∈ Rn`
+ , if there are i,j
such that Ri = Rj,y iPixiPixjPiyj, and for h 6= i,j, xh = yh, then x ¯ P(R)y.
154 Allocation Rules Need Marginal Rates of
Substitution
For allocation rules, we ﬁrst obtain a parallel to Arrow’s theorem, although,
strictly speaking, there is a possibility result even with the strongest form of
IIA and Anonymity.
Proposition 6 If S satisﬁes Pareto, IIA and Anonymity, then
∀R ∈ R
n,S (R)={x ∈ R
nl
+|∃i ∈ N,xi = ω}.
If S satisﬁes Pareto, IIA and is essentially single-valued, then it is dictatorial.
Proof. By Lemma 3, IIA⇔IP. By Pareto and IP, S(R) must contain only
allocations such that
∃i ∈ N,xi = ω
because for any other allocation y,o n ec a nﬁnd R0 such that y/ ∈ E(R).
By IP, for all R,R0 ∈ Rn,
{i ∈ N|∃x ∈ S(R),x i = ω} = {i ∈ N|∃x ∈ S(R
0),x i = ω}.
Therefore Anonymity requires {i ∈ N|∃x ∈ S(R),x i = ω} = N, whereas
essential single-valuedness requires {i ∈ N|∃x ∈ S(R),x i = ω} = i0 for some
ﬁxed i0.
It can also be immediately deduced from the proof that there does not
exist an AR satisfying Pareto, IIA, and Equal Treatment of Equals.
The next result is that with IIA-MRS, Equal Treatment of Equals
becomes attainable, but there remains a diﬃculty with essential single-
valuedness.
Proposition 7 There exists an AR satisfying Pareto, IIA-MRS,
Anonymity, and Equal Treatment of Equals. There exists a non-dictatorial
and essentially single-valued AR satisfying Pareto, IIA-MRS. However, there
does not exist an essentially single-valued AR satisfying Pareto, IIA-MRS
and Anonymity.
Proof. The ﬁrst possibility is illustrated by the Egalitarian Walrasian AR
SW,d e ﬁned as follows: x ∈ SW(R) if x ∈ F and there is p ∈ R`
++ such that
for all i ∈ N,
∀y ∈ R
`
+,p · y ≤ p · ω/n ⇒ xiRiy.
16The second possibility is illustrated by the AR Sp0 deﬁned for a given
p0 ∈ R`
++ as follows: if p0 ∈ C(ω,R 1),t h e nS(R)={x} where x1 = ω,a n d
otherwise, S(R)={y} where y2 = ω.
For the impossibility, recall that by essential single-valuedness of S and
Lemma 3, IIA-MRS⇔IP-MRS. Let R∗ be the subset of R such for all R ∈ R∗,










Let R ∈ R∗n
be given. Assume that there is x ∈ S(R) \ SW(R). By Pareto
x ∈ E(R). Hence, we have xi ∈ R`
++ or xi =0for all i, and there is a shadow
price vector p ∈ R`
++ such that
∀i ∈ N, C(xi,R i)={p} or xi =0 .






0 ⇔ p · z ≥ p · z
0.
Let Rp =( Rp,...,Rp) ∈ Rn. By IP-MRS, x ∈ S(Rp). Since x/ ∈ SW(R), there
exist i,j, xiPpxj, in contradiction to Equal Treatment of Equals. (Recollect
that, by Lemma 1, essential single-valuedness and Anonymity imply Equal
Treatment of Equals.) As a consequence, S(R) ⊂ SW(R).
Assume there is x ∈ SW(R) \ S(R). For all i ∈ N, let R0
i ∈ R∗ be







. We have x ∈ SW(R0).M o r e o v e r , b y T h .1
in Eisenberg (1961), all allocations in SW(R0) are Pareto-indiﬀerent. By
strict convexity of preferences, one therefore has SW(R0)={x}. Since
S(R0) ⊂ SW(R0), we have S(R0)={x}. By IP-MRS, x ∈ S(R), which
is a contradiction. Therefore SW(R) ⊂ S(R).
In conclusion, S(R)=SW(R) for any proﬁle R ∈ R∗n.B u tw ec a nﬁnd
ap r o ﬁle R ∈ R∗nsuch that SW(R) contains two allocations x,y, and there
exists i with xiPiyi. This contradicts essential single-valuedness.
One can adapt the proof in order to show that the impossibility would
not be removed by considering ε-neighborhoods instead of MRS, for ε small
enough. Only with IIA-ISFA do we really obtain a full possibility result.
17Proposition 8 There exists an essentially single-valued AR satisfying
Pareto, IP-ISFA and Anonymity.
Proof. Let R ∈ Rn, ω ∈ R`
++ be given. One deﬁnes S by: x ∈ S(R) if
x ∈ E(R) and there is α ∈ R+ such that for all i ∈ N,
xiIiαω.
It obviously satisﬁes Pareto and Anonymity. To check that it satisﬁes IP-
ISFA, notice that necessarily α < 1, so that αω ∈ Ω(ω).
Notice that the AR described in the proof also satisﬁes Equal Treatment
of Equals (by Lemma 1). And there are many examples of ARs satisfying
Pareto, Anonymity and IP-WIS. In fact all the main ARs from the theory of
fair allocation satisfy IP-WIS.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In a framework with purely ordinal, non-comparable preferences, a satisfac-
tory social ordering function requires, when ranking any pair of allocations,
information about the shape of indiﬀerence curves that goes well beyond
purely local data such as marginal rates of substitution and preferences in ε-
neighborhood. This is the ﬁrst lesson of this paper. The second is that even
for less demanding allocation rules, it is also necessary to introduce more
information than what is allowed in the Arrow independence of irrelevant
alternatives. The third is that, nonetheless, a purely local information such
as marginal rates of substitution is suﬃcient for allocation rules, whereas it
is not for social ordering functions.
We hope that our paper, more broadly, contributes to clarifying the in-
formational foundations in the theory of social choice and in the theory of
fair allocation, and also to clarifying the links and diﬀerences between these
two theories.
There are limits to our work which should be emphasized here, and call
for further research. First, we study a particular model, and it would be
worth analyzing the same issues in other models such as the standard ab-
stract model of social choice or other economic models, in particular models
with public goods (the case of consumption externalities in our model could
also be subsumed under the case of public goods). Second, the information
18about indiﬀerence curves is a complex set of objects and our analysis is far
from being exhaustive on the pieces of data which can extracted from this
s e t .F o ri n s t a n c e ,i tw o u l db en i c et oh a v eam e a s u r eo ft h ed e g r e et ow h i c ha
given piece of information is local. Third, there may be other kinds of inter-
esting additional information. For instance, Roberts (1980) has considered
introducing information about utilities and about non-local preferences at
the same time, and was able to characterize the Nash social welfare function
on this basis. There certainly are many avenues of research along these lines.
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217 Appendices
7.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on the following lemmas.
Let Y ⊂ X be a given ﬁnite subset of X. Let i ∈ N be given. Let Yi =
{yi ∈ R`
+| ∃y−i ∈ R
(n−1)`
+ ,(yi,y −i) ∈ Y }.F o re a c hyi ∈ Yi,l e tQ(yi) ⊂ R`
++
be given. We say that the set Yi satisﬁes the supporting condition with the
supporting price vectors {Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi} if for all yi ∈ Yi,a l lq ∈ Q(yi),a n d
all y0
i ∈ Yi with y0
i 6= yi, q · yi <q· y0
i.L e t
R(Yi,{Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi})={Ri ∈ R| ∀yi ∈ Yi,C(yi,R i)=Q(yi)}.
The set of all preorderings on Yi is denoted by O(Yi). For any Ri ∈ R,R i|Yi
denotes the restriction of Ri on Yi
11. For any R0⊂ R, let R0|Yi = {Ri|Yi | Ri ∈
R0}. For any xi ∈ X and any Ri ∈ R, let U(xi,R i)={ x0
i ∈ X | x0
i Ri xi }
denote the (weak) upper contour set of xi for Ri.
Lemma 4 If a ﬁnite set Yi ⊂ R`
+ satisﬁes the supporting condition with the
supporting price vectors {Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi},t h e nR(Yi,{Q(yi)|yi ∈ Yi})|Yi =
O(Yi).
Proof. We need to show that O(Yi) ⊆ R(Yi,{Q(yi)|yi ∈ Yi})|Yi. Let R0
∈ O(Yi) be any preordering on Yi. Construct a preordering Ri ∈ R so that
the upper contour set of each yi ∈ Yi is deﬁned as follows. Let xi ∈ Yi be
such that for all yi ∈ Yi, yi R0
i xi. Let Y 1












+ | q · x
0
i ≥ q · yi}
Let I(xi,R i) be the boundary of U(xi,R i). Clearly, for all yi ∈ Y 1
i ,C (yi,R i)
= Q(yi). We also have that for all yi ∈ Yi\Y 1
i , and for all x0
i ∈ I(xi,R i),y i Pi
x0
i. Given ε > 0, let εU(xi,R i)={x0
i ∈ R`
+ | ∃ai ∈ U(xi,R i),x 0
i = εai}, and
let εI(xi,R i) be the boundary of εU(xi,R i). For suﬃciently small ε, we have
that for all yi ∈ Yi\Y 1
i , and for all x0
i ∈ εI(xi,R i), yiPix0
i. Let zi ∈ Yi\Y 1
i be
such that for all yi ∈ Yi\Y 1
i , yi R0
i zi. Let Y 2
i = {yi ∈ Yi\Y 1















+ | q · x
0
i ≥ q · yi}


11Namely, Ri|Yi is the preordering on Yi such that for all xi,y i ∈ Yi,x i Ri|Yi yi ⇐⇒
xiRiyi.
22Let I(zi,R i) be the boundary of U(zi,R i). By deﬁnition, for all yi ∈ Y 2
i ,
C(yi,R i)=Q(yi). We have that for all yi ∈ Yi\(Y 1
i ∪ Y 2
i ), and for all
x0
i ∈ I(zi,R i),y i Pi x0
i. In the same way as above, we can construct the
upper contour set of each yi ∈ Yi\(Y 1
i ∪ Y 2
i ). By its construction, Ri ∈
R(Yi,{Q(yi)|yi ∈ Yi}) and Ri|Yi = R0. Thus, R0 ∈ R(Yi,{Q(yi)|yi ∈ Yi})|Yi.
Let ¯ R be a social ordering function. Let Y ⊆ X and R0 ⊆ Rn be given.
We say that agent i0 ∈ N is a local dictator for ¯ R over (Y,R0) if for all
x,y ∈ Y ,a n da l lR ∈ R0, xi0Pi0yi0 implies x ¯ P(R)y.
Lemma 5 Let ¯ R be a social ordering function satisfying Weak Pareto and
IIA-MRS. Let Y ⊂ X be a ﬁnite subset of X such that |Y | ≥ 3.12 Suppose
that for all i ∈ N, Yi satisﬁes the supporting condition with the supporting
price vectors {Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi}. Then, there exists a local dictator i0 ∈ N for
¯ R over (Y,
Q
i∈N R(Yi,{Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi})).
Proof. For all R,R0 ∈
Q
i∈N R(Yi,{Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi}), all y ∈ Y, and all
i ∈ N, C(yi,R i)=C(yi,R 0
i). Since ¯ R satisﬁes IIA-MRS, we have that for
all x,y ∈ Y, and all R,R0 ∈
Q
i∈N R(Yi,{Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi}), if for all i ∈
N, xiRiyi ⇔ xiR0
iyi, then x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ x ¯ R(R0)y. By Lemma 4, for all i ∈
N,R(Yi,{Q(yi)|yi ∈ Yi})|Yi = O(Yi). Hence, by Arrow’s Theorem, there
exists a local dictator for ¯ R over (Y,
Q
i∈N R(Yi,{Q(yi)| yi ∈ Yi})).
We say that a subset Y of X is free for agent i if R|Yi = O(Yi). It is
free if it is free for all i ∈ N. If Y contains two elements, it is a free pair.
If Y contains three elements, it is a free triple.N o t e t h a t a s e t {x,y} is a
free pair for i ∈ N if and only if for some k,k0 ∈ {1,···,`}, xik >y ik and
yik0 >x ik0. Given two consumption bundles xi,y i ∈ R`
+,d e ﬁne xi ∧ yi ∈ R`
+
as (xi ∧ yi)k =m i n {xik,y ik} for all k ∈ {1,···,`}.
Lemma 6 Let ¯ R be a social ordering function satisfying Weak Pareto and
IIA-MRS. If {x,y} ⊂ X is a free pair, then there exists a local dictator for
¯ R over ({x,y},Rn).
Proof. Let ¯ R b eas o c i a lo r d e r i n gf u n c t i o ns a t i s f y i n gW e a kP a r e t oa n d
IIA-MRS. Let {x,y} ⊂ X be a free pair. Let
K1 = {k ∈ {1,···,`}|xik >y ik}
K2 = {k ∈ {1,···,`}|xik <y ik}
12Given a set A, |A| denotes the cardinality of A.
23Since {x,y} is a free pair, K1,K 2 6= ∅.
Step 1 : For each i ∈ N,w ed e ﬁne two consumption bundles zi,w i ∈ X as
follows:






(xi − xi ∧ yi)+
1
3
(yi − xi ∧ yi)
¾
(1)






(xi − xi ∧ yi)+
2
3
(yi − xi ∧ yi)
¾
(2)
Figure 1 illustrates the bundles xi,y i,x i ∧ yi,z i,w i, and also bi,v i,t i, which
are deﬁn e di nt h en e x ts t e p .L e tq ∈ R`










qk(xik − yik) (3)
Since K1 6= ∅, the right-hand-side of (3) can be arbitrarily large as (qk)k∈K1
become large, (qk)k∈K2 being constant. Hence, there exists a price vector
q(yi) ∈ R`
++ that satisﬁes inequality (3). With some calculations, it can be
shown that q(yi) · yi <q (yi) · zi and q(yi) · yi <q (yi) · xi.
Similarly, for each a ∈ {xi,z i,w i},w ec a nﬁnd a price vector q(a) ∈ R`
++
such that for all a0 ∈ {xi,z i,w i,y i} with a0 6= a, q(a)·a<q (a)·a0. Hence, the
set Y 0
i = {xi,z i,w i,y i} satisﬁes the supporting condition with the supporting
price vectors {q(xi),q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}.13
Let z =( zi)i∈N and w =( wi)i∈N.L e t Y 0 = {x,z,w,y}.





Step 2: We will show that agent i0 is a local dictator for ¯ R over ({x,y},Rn).
Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists a preference proﬁle R0 ∈ Rn
such that (i) xi0P0
i0yi0 and y ¯ R(R0)x or (ii) yi0P0
i0xi0 and x ¯ R(R0)y. Without
loss of generality, suppose that (i) holds. Let Y 1 = {z,w,y}. Since agent i0 is








(Otherwise, by Lemma 5, there exists a local dictator j 6= i0
for ¯ R over (Y 1,
Q
i∈N R(Y 1
i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}), and we can con-
struct a preference proﬁle R ∈
Q
i∈N R(Y 0
i ,{q(xi),q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}) ⊂ Q
i∈N R(Y 1
i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}) such that zi0Pi0wi0 and wjPjzj. Hence we
must have z ¯ P(R)w and w ¯ P(R)z, which is a contradiction.)
13With a slight abuse of notation, we write {q(wi),q(zi),q(yi)} for
{{q(wi)},{q(zi)},{q(yi)}}.
24We deﬁne two allocations v,t ∈ X in the following steps. Let i ∈ N.F i r s t ,
deﬁne bi ∈ R`
+ as follows: If for all q ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q · (yi − xi) ≥ 0,t h e nl e t
bi = yi.I ff o rs o m eq ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q·(yi−xi) < 0,t h e nl e tθ > 0 be a positive
number such that for all q ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q ·{ yi + θ(yi − xi ∧ yi) − xi} > 0.
Since q ∈ R`
++ by strict monotonicity of preferences, and yi − xi ∧ yi > 0,
such a number θ exists. Then, deﬁne bi = yi + θ(yi − xi ∧ yi).B yd e ﬁnition,
bi >y i, and for all q ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q · (bi − xi) > 0.L e t
vi = bi +2 ( bi − xi ∧ yi)
Then, vi >b i >y i,a n df o ra l lq ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q · (vi − xi) > 0.
Next, let






(vi − xi ∧ yi)+
1
3
(wi − xi ∧ yi)
¾
Then,
ti = bi +
1
6
(wi − xi ∧ yi) >b i
and for all q ∈ C(xi,R 0
i), q · xi <q· ti.
As in Step 1,w ec a nﬁnd price vectors q(vi),q(ti) ∈ R`
++ such that q(vi)·
vi <q (vi) · a for all a ∈ {xi,z i,w i,t i},a n dq(ti) · ti <q (ti) · a for all a ∈
{xi,z i,w i,v i}.
On the other hand, because vi >y i and ti >y i,w eh a v et h a tq(zi) · zi <
q(zi) · a for all a ∈ {ti,v i},a n dq(wi) · wi <q (wi) · a for all a ∈ {ti,v i}.
So far we have shown that
(i) the set Y 1
i = {xi,t i,v i} satisﬁes the supporting condition with the sup-
porting price vectors {C(xi,R 0
i),q(ti),q(vi)}.
(ii) the set Y 2
i = {zi,w i,t i,v i} satisﬁes the supporting condition with the
supporting price vectors {q(zi),q(wi),q(ti),q(vi)}.
Let v =( vi)i∈N and t =( ti)i∈N.L e t Y 1 = {x,t,v} and Y 2 =









i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(ti),q(vi)}). Recall that agent i0 ∈ N is
the local dictator for ¯ R over (Y 0,
Q
i∈N R(Y 0
i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}).L e tR1 ∈
Rn be a preference proﬁle such that for all i ∈ N, C(xi,R 1
i)=C(xi,R 0
i),
and for all ai ∈ {ti,v i,w i,y i,z i}, C(ai,R 1


























i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(yi)}, and agent i0 is the local dictator
for ¯ R over (Y 0,
Q
i∈N R(Y 0




i ,{q(zi),q(wi),q(ti),q(vi)}, this implies that i0 = i2. Hence,





that i0 = i1.
Let R2 ∈ Rn be a preference proﬁle such that xi0P2
i0vi0 and for all
i ∈ N, R2
i|{xi,yi} = R0





i)={q(vi)} and C(yi,R 2
i)=C(yi,R 0
i). Since agent i0 ∈ N





have that x ¯ P(R2)v. Recall that for all i ∈ N, vi >y i. Hence, by strict
monotonicity of preferences, viP2
i yi for all i ∈ N. Because the social order-
ing function ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto, we have v ¯ P(R2)y. By transitivity of
¯ R, x ¯ P(R2)y. However, since ¯ R satisﬁes IIA-MRS, and y ¯ R(R0)x,w em u s t
have y ¯ R(R2)x. This is a contradiction.
Lemma 7 Let ¯ R be a social ordering function satisfying Weak Pareto and
IIA-MRS. If {x,y,z} ⊂ X is a free triple, then there exists a local dictator
for ¯ R over ({x,y,z},Rn).
Proof. By Lemma 6, there exist a local dictator i0 over ({x,y},Rn), ,al o c a l
dictator i1 over ({y,z},Rn), and a local dictator i2 over ({x,z},Rn). Suppose
that i0 6= i1. Let R ∈ Rn be a preference proﬁle such that xi0Pi0yi0,y i2Pi2zi3,
and zi1Pi1xi1. Then, we have x ¯ P(R)y ¯ P(R)z ¯ P(R)x, which contradicts the
transitivity of ¯ R(R). Hence, we must have i0 = i1. B yt h es a m ea r g u m e n t ,
we have i0 = i1 = i2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :L e t¯ R be a social ordering function satisfying
Weak Pareto and IIA-MRS. By Lemma 6, for every free pair {x,y} ⊂ X,
there exists a local dictator over ({x,y},Rn). By Lemma 7 and Bordes and
Le Breton (1989, Theorem 2), these dictators must be the same individual.
Denote the individual by i0. It remains to show that for any pair {x,y} that
is not free, i0 is the local dictator over ({x,y},Rn). Suppose, on the contrary,
that there exist {x,y} ⊂ X and R ∈ Rn such that {x,y} is not a free pair,
and xi0Pi0yi0 but y ¯ R(R)x. Deﬁne zi0 ∈ R`
+ as follows.
Case 1: {x,y} is a free pair for i0.
For all λ ∈]0,1[, {λx +( 1− λ)y,x} and {λx +( 1− λ)y,y} are free pairs for
i0. By continuity, there exists λ
∗ such that xi0Pi0[λ
∗xi0 +( 1− λ
∗)yi0]Pi0yi0.
Then, let zi0 = λ
∗xi0 +( 1− λ
∗)yi0..
Case 2: {x,y} is not a free pair for i0.
26Then, for all k ∈ {1,···,`},x i0k ≥ yi0k with at least one strict inequality.
Note that y 6=0 .
Case 2-1: There exists k0 such that for all k ∈ {1,···,`} with k 6= k0,
xi0k = yi0k and yi0k0 > 0.
Then, xi0k0 >y i0k0 > 0. Given ε > 0, deﬁne wi0 ∈ R`
+ as wi0k0 = yi0k0
and for all k 6= k0,w i0k = yi0k + ε. For suﬃciently small ε, we have
xi0Pi0wi0Pi0yi0. Given δ > 0, deﬁne ti0 ∈ R`
+ as ti0k0 = wi0k0 − δ and for
all k 6= k0,t i0k = wi0k. For suﬃciently small δ, we have xi0Pi0ti0Pi0yi0. More-
over, {t,x} and {t,y} are free pairs for i0. Then, let zi0 = ti0.
Case 2-2: There exists k0 such that for all k ∈ {1,···,`} with k 6= k0,
xi0k = yi0k and yi0k0 =0 .
Then, for all k ∈ {1,···,`} with k 6= k0,x i0k = yi0k > 0. Let k00 6= k0. Given
ε > 0, deﬁne wi0 ∈ R`
+ as wi0k00 = xi0k00 − ε and for all k 6= k00,w i0k = xi0k.
For suﬃciently small ε, we have xi0Pi0wi0Pi0yi0. Given δ > 0, deﬁne ti0 ∈ R`
+
as ti0k0 = wi0k0 + δ and for all k 6= k0,t i0k = wi0k. For suﬃciently small δ, we
have xi0Pi0ti0Pi0yi0. Moreover, {t,x} and {t,y} are free pairs for i0. Then,
let zi0 = ti0.
Case 2-3: There exists k0,k 00 ∈ {1,···,`} with k0 6= k00,x i0k0 >y i0k0 and
xi0k00 >y i0k00.
Let k∗ be such that yi0k∗ > 0. Given ε > 0, deﬁne wi0 ∈ R`
+ as wi0k∗ =
yi0k∗ − ε and for all k 6= k∗,w i0k = xi0k. For suﬃciently small ε, we have
xi0Pi0wi0Pi0yi0. Let k∗∗ 6= k∗. Given δ > 0, deﬁne ti0 ∈ R`
+ as ti0k∗∗ = wi0k∗∗+δ
and for all k 6= k∗∗,t i0k = wi0k. For suﬃciently small δ, we have xi0Pi0ti0Pi0yi0.
Moreover, {t,x} and {t,y} a r ef r e ep a i r sf o ri0. Then, let zi0 = ti0.
Next, for each i 6= i0, let zi ∈ R`
+ be such that {z,x} and {z,y} are free
pairs for i. B yt h es a m ec o n s t r u c t i o na sa b o v e ,w ec a nﬁnd such zi ∈ R`
+
for each i. Let z =( zi)i∈N ∈ Rn`
+ . Since i0 is the dictator over all free pairs,
we have that x ¯ P(R)z and z ¯ P(R)y. By transitivity of ¯ R, we have x ¯ P(R)y,
which contradicts the supposition that y ¯ R(R)x.¥
7.2 Proof of Proposition 4
To prove the possibility result, let
R







and say that a preference preordering R ∈ R is diﬀerentiable at zero if there
exists an open set V containing 0 such that R is diﬀerentiable on V ∩ R`
+.
27If R ∈ R∗n,x∈ Rn`
++ and y ∈ Rn`
+ \ Rn`
++, then there is i ∈ N such that
xiPiyi. Deﬁne ¯ R as follows. One has x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ x1R1y1 whenever R / ∈ R∗n
or x,y ∈ Rn`
+ \ Rn`
++, or x,y ∈ Rn`
++ and R1 is diﬀerentiable at zero. One
has x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ x2R2y2 whenever R ∈ R∗n and x,y ∈ Rn`
++ and R1 is not





To check Weak Pareto, assume that xiPiyi for all i. Then, when R ∈ R∗n
it is impossible to have y ∈ Rn`
++ and x ∈ Rn`
+ \ Rn`
++, so that in all possible
cases, necessarily x ¯ P(R)y. To check IIA-ISFA, notice that when x,y ∈ Rn`
++,
Ω(ω(x,y)) contains a neighborhood of 0, so that by changing individual pref-
erences on R`
+ \ Ω(ω(x,y)), one cannot change the fact that R1 is diﬀeren-
tiable at zero or not. When y ∈ Rn`
+ \Rn`
++, one has x ¯ P(R)y if x ∈ Rn`
++, and
x ¯ R(R)y ⇔ x1R1y1 if x ∈ Rn`
+ \Rn`
++, which means that individual preferences
on Ω(ω(x,y)) (actually, on {x,y}) fully determine ¯ R(R) on {x,y}. Now, one
sees that no agent is a dictator, for all proﬁles, over all allocations in A.
Finally, it remains to check that transitivity is always obtained. If R / ∈ R∗n,
this is due to transitivity of R1. If R ∈ R∗n, and R1 is diﬀerentiable at zero,
transitivity is similarly guaranteed over Rn`
+ \Rn`
++ and over Rn`
++, while strict
social preference always occurs for Rn`
++ against Rn`
+ \ Rn`
++. If R ∈ R∗n, and
R1 is not diﬀerentiable at zero, transitivity is guaranteed over Rn`
+ \ Rn`
++
by transitivity of R1, and over Rn`
++ by transitivity of R2, while strict social




In order to prove the impossibility, it is convenient to consider diﬀerent
possible sizes of the population. Let λ ≥ 1 be such that IIA-ISEFA is satisﬁed
by ¯ R with respect to it.
Case 1: n =2 . Consider the bundles x =( 8 ,1/(2λ),0,...),y =
(12,1/(2λ),0,...),z=( 1 /(2λ),12,0,...),w=( 1 /(2λ),8,0,...). Let pref-
erences R1 and R2 be deﬁned as follows. On the subset
S1 = {v ∈ R
`
+|∀i ∈ {3,...,`},v i =0and v2 ≤ min{v1,1}}
one has
vR1v





and on the subset
S2 = {v ∈ R
`
+|∀i ∈ {3,...,`},v i =0and v1 ≤ min{v2,1}},
one has
vR1v






w1 +( 1− w1)+2[ w2 − 2(1− w1)] >x 1 +2 x2
and
2[y1 − 2(1− y2)] + y2 +( 1− y2) > 2z1 + z2,
it is possible to complete the deﬁnition of R1 such that wP1x and yP1z. Then
deﬁne R2 so that it coincides with R1 on S1 ∪ S2. Similarly, it is possible to
complete the deﬁnition of R2 such that xP2w and zP2y. Figure 2 illustrates
this construction (for λ =1 ).
If the proﬁle of preferences is R =( R1,R 2), by Weak Pareto one has:
(y,x) ¯ P(R)(z,w) and (w,z) ¯ P(R)(x,y).
If the proﬁle of preferences is R0 =( R1,R 1), by Anonymity one has:
(y,x)¯ I(R
0)(x,y) and (w,z)¯ I(R
0)(z,w).
By IIA-ISEFA, since R1 and R2 coincide on S1 ∪ S2,
(y,x)¯ I(R
0)(x,y) ⇔ (y,x)¯ I(R)(x,y)
and (w,z)¯ I(R
0)(z,w) ⇔ (w,z)¯ I(R)(z,w).
By transitivity, one gets (x,y) ¯ P(R)(x,y), which is impossible.
Case 2: n =3 . Consider the bundles x =( 8 ,1/(3λ),0,...),y =
(12,1/(3λ),0,...),t=( 1 0 ,1/(3λ),0,...),z=( 1 /(3λ),12,0,...),w=
(1/(3λ),8,0,...),r=( 1 /(3λ),10,0,...). Let preferences R1, R2 and R3 be
deﬁned as above on the subset S1∪S2. And complete their deﬁnition so that
yP1z, wP1x, tP2r, zP2y, xP3w, rP3t.
If the proﬁle of preferences is R =( R1,R 2,R 3), by Weak Pareto one has:
(y,t,x) ¯ P(R)(z,r,w) and (w,z,r) ¯ P(R)(x,y,t).
If the proﬁle of preferences is R0 =( R1,R 1,R 1), by Anonymity one has:
(y,t,x)¯ I(R
0)(x,y,t) and (w,z,r)¯ I(R
0)(z,r,w).
By IIA-ISEFA, since R1,R 2 and R3 coincide on S1, and S2 respectively,
(y,t,x)¯ I(R
0)(x,y,t) ⇔ (y,t,x)¯ I(R)(x,y,t)
and (w,z,r)¯ I(R
0)(z,r,w) ⇔ (w,z,r)¯ I(R)(z,r,w).
29By transitivity, one gets (x,y,t) ¯ P(R)(x,y,t), which is impossible.
Case 3: n =2 k. Partition the population into k pairs, and construct an
argument similar to the case n =2 , with the bundles x =( 8 ,1/(nλ),0,...),
y =( 1 2 ,1/(nλ),0,...),z=( 1 /(nλ),12,0,...),w=( 1 /(nλ),8,0,...), and
the allocations (y,x,y,x,...), (x,y,x,y,...), (z,w,z,w,...) and (w,z,w,z,...).
Case 4: n =2 k+1. Partition the population into k−1 pairs and one triple,
and construct an argument combining the cases n =2and n =3 , with the
bundles x =( 8 ,1/(nλ),0,...),y=( 1 2 ,1/(nλ),0,...),t=( 1 0 ,1/(nλ),0,...),
z =( 1 /(nλ),12,0,...),w=( 1 /(nλ),8,0,...),r=( 1 /(nλ),10,0,...), and





































Figure 1: Proof of Lemma 6
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Figure 2: Proof of Proposition 4
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